Wikipedia Vandal Early Detection: from User Behavior to User Embedding by Yuan, Shuhan et al.
Wikipedia Vandal Early Detection:
from User Behavior to User Embedding
Shuhan Yuan1, Panpan Zheng2, Xintao Wu2, and Yang Xiang1
1 Tongji University, Shanghai 201805, China,
{4e66,shxiangyang}@tongji.edu.cn
2 University of Arkansas, Fayetteville AR 72701, USA
{pzheng,xintaowu}@uark.edu
Abstract. Wikipedia is the largest online encyclopedia that allows any-
one to edit articles. In this paper, we propose the use of deep learning
to detect vandals based on their edit history. In particular, we develop a
multi-source long-short term memory network (M-LSTM) to model user
behaviors by using a variety of user edit aspects as inputs, including
the history of edit reversion information, edit page titles and categories.
With M-LSTM, we can encode each user into a low dimensional real vec-
tor, called user embedding. Meanwhile, as a sequential model, M-LSTM
updates the user embedding each time after the user commits a new
edit. Thus, we can predict whether a user is benign or vandal dynami-
cally based on the up-to-date user embedding. Furthermore, those user
embeddings are crucial to discover collaborative vandals.
1 Introduction
Wikipedia, as one of the world’s largest knowledge bases on the web, is heav-
ily relied on thousands of volunteers to make contributions. This crowdsourcing
mechanism based on the freedom-to-edit model (i.e., any user can edit any ar-
ticle) leads to a rapid growth of Wikipedia. However, Wikipedia is plagued by
vandlism, namely “deliberate attempts to damage or compromise integrity” 3.
Those vandals who commit acts of vandalism damage the quality of articles and
spread false information, misleading information, or nonsense to Wikipedia users
as well as information systems such as search engines and question-answering
systems.
Reviewing millions of edits every month incurs an extremely high workload.
Wikipedia has deployed a number of tools for automatic vandalism detection,
like ClueBot NG 4 and STiki 5. These tools use heuristic rules to detect and
revert apparently bad edits, thus helping administrators to identify and block
vandals. However, those bots are mainly designed to score edits and revert the
worst-scoring edits.
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikidata:Vandalism
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:ClueBot_NG
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:STiki
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Detecting vandals and vandalized pages from crowdsourcing knowledge bases
has attracted increasing attention in the research community [9, 11, 17]. For ex-
ample, [9] focused on predicting whether an edit is vandalism. They developed a
set of 47 features that exploit both content and context information of users and
edits. The content features of an edit are defined at levels of character, word,
sentence, and statement whereas the context features are used to quantify users,
edited items, and their respective revision histories. [11] focused on predicting
whether an user is a vandal based on user edits. The developed VEWS system
adopted a set of behavior features based on edit-pairs and edit-patterns, such as
vandals make faster edits than benign user, benign users spend more time edit-
ing a new page than vandals, or benign users more likely edit a meta-page than
vandals. All the above features empirically capture the differences between good
edits and vandalism to some extent and there is no doubt that classifiers (e.g.,
randomforest or SVM) with these features as input can achieve good accuracy
of detecting vandalism.
Different from the existing approaches that heavily rely on hand-designed
features, we tackle the problem of vandal detection by automatically learning
user behavior representations from their edit sequences. Each edit in a user’s
edit sequence contains many attributes such as PageID, Title, Time, Categories,
PageType, Revert Status, and Content. We transform each edit sequence into
multiple aspect sequences and develop a multi-source long-short term memory
network (M-LSTM) to detect vandals. Each LSTM processes one aspect se-
quence and learns the hidden representation of the corresponding aspect of user
edits. The LSTM as a sequence model can represent the user edit sequence with
variable-length as fixed-length real vectors, i.e., aspect representations. We then
apply the attention model [4, 28] to derive the user representation, called user
embedding, by combining all aspect representations. The user embedding accu-
rately captures all aspects of an user’s edit information. Thus we can use user
embeddings as classifier input to separate vandals from benign users. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work to use the deep neural network to rep-
resent users as user embeddings which capture the information of user behavior
for vandal detection.
Our approach has several advantages over past efforts. First, neither heuris-
tic rules nor hand-designed features are needed. Second, while each user may
have a different number of edits and each user may have different edit behavior,
we map each user into the same low-dimensional embedding space. Thus user
embeddings can be easily used for a variety of data mining tasks such as clas-
sification, clustering, outlier analysis, and visualization. Third, by using various
aspect information (e.g., article title and categories), our M-LSTM is able to ef-
fectively capture hidden relationships between different users. The derived user
embeddings can be used to analyze collaborative vandals who commit acts of
vandalism together to impose big damages and/or evade detection. Fourth, our
M-LSTM can naturally achieve early vandal detection and has great potential
to be deployed for dynamically monitoring user edits and conducting real-time
vandal detection.
2 Related Work
Deep neural networks have achieved promising results in image [8], text [16],
and speech recognition [7]. The key ingredient for the successful of deep neural
network is because it learns meaningful representations of inputs [5]. For exam-
ple, in text area, all the words are trained to represent as real-valued vectors
called word embeddings which capture the semantic relations among words [16].
Then, a neural network model can further combine the word embeddings to
represent the sentences or documents [28]. For image recognition, a deep neural
network can learn different levels of image representations on different levels of
the neural network [30]. In this work, we propose M-LSTM model to train the
representation of users and further use them to predict vandals.
Most work for vandalism detection extracts features, e.g., content-based fea-
tures [1, 17], context features to measure user reputation [2], spatial-temporal
user information [26], and then uses those features as classifier inputs to predict
vandalism. Moreover, [14] utilizes search engine to check the correctness of user
edits. However, it is difficult to apply these approaches based on hand-design
features to detect subtle and collaborative vandalism.
Wikipedia vandal detection is related to fake review detection. In [18], dif-
ferent types of behavior feature were extracted and used to detect the fake
reviews in Yelp. [12] have identified several representative behaviors of review
spammers. [27] studied the co-anomaly patterns in multiple review based time
series. [6] proposed approaches to detect fake reviews by characterizing bursti-
ness of review. There has been extensive research on detecting anomaly from
graph data [3, 24] and detecting Web ranking spams [23]. [19] have studied var-
ious aspects of content-based spam on the Web and presented several heuristic
methods for detecting content based spam. Finding time points at which graph
changes significantly given a sequence of graphs has also been studied [20]. Al-
though some of above approaches can be used for vandal detection, they are not
able to automatically extract and fuse multiple aspects of user edit behaviors.
3 Multi-source LSTM for Vandal Early Detection
Our key idea is to adopt multiple LSTMs to transform a variable-length edit
sequence into multiple fixed-length aspect representations and further use the
attention model to combine all aspect representations into the user embedding.
As user embeddings capture all aspects of user edits as well as relationships
among users, they can be used for detecting vandals and examining behaviors
of vandalism.
3.1 LSTM Revisited
Long short-term memory network [10], as one class of recurrent neural networks
(RNNs), was proposed to model the long-range sequences and has achieved great
success in natural language processing and speech recognition recently. Figure 1
Fig. 1: Standard LSTM for Classification
shows the structure of the standard LSTM for classification. Given a sequence
x = (x1, . . . ,xt, . . . ,xT ) where xt ∈ Rd denotes the input at the t-th step,
LSTM maintains a hidden state vector ht ∈ Rh to keep track the sequence
information with the input from the current step xt and the previous hidden
state ht−1. LSTM is composed by a special unit called memory block in the
recurrent hidden layer to compute the hidden state vector ht. Each memory
block contains self-connected internal memory cells and special multiplicative
units called gates to control what kinds of information need to be encoded to
the internal memory or discarded. Each memory block has an input gate to
control the input information into the memory cell, a forget gate to forget or
reset the current memory, and an output gate to control the output of cell into
the hidden state. Formally, the hidden state ht is computed by
c˜t = tanh(Wcxt + Ucht−1 + bc)
it = σ(Wixt + Uiht−1 + bi)
ft = σ(Wfxt + Ufht−1 + bf )
ot = σ(Woxt + Uoht−1 + bo)
ct = it  c˜t + ft  ct−1
ht = ot  tanh(ct)
(1)
where σ is the sigmoid activation function;  represents element-wise product;
it, ft, ot, ct indicate the input gate, forget gate, output gate, and cell activation
vectors and c˜t denotes the intermediate vector of cell state; W and U are the
weight parameters; b is the bias term. We denote all LSTM parameters (W, U
and b ) as Θ1.
After the LSTM reaches the last step T , hT encodes the information of the
whole sequence and is considered as the representation of the sequence. It can
then be used as input of the softmax classifier,
P (yˆ = k|hT ) = exp (w
T
k hT + bk)∑K
k′=1 exp(w
T
k′hT + bk′)
, (2)
where K is number of classes, yˆ is the predicted class of the sequence, wk and bk
are the parameters of softmax function for the k-th class, and wTk indicates the
transpose of wk. All softmax parameters Wk and bk over K classes are denoted
as Θ2. The LSTM model aims to optimize Θ1 and Θ2 by minimizing the cross
entropy loss function,
L = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi ∗ log(P (yˆi)), (3)
where yi is the true class of the i-th sequence, and N is the number of training
sequences.
3.2 Multi-source LSTM
Fig. 2: Multi-source LSTM
We develop a multi-source LSTM model to capture all useful aspects of edits.
As different aspects carry different weights for vandal detection, we adopt the
attention model [4,28] to dynamically learn the importance of each aspect. The
user embeddings are then used as inputs of softmax classifier to separate vandals
from benign users.
Formally, for user u with T edits, his edits can be modeled as a sequence
eu = (eu1 , . . . , eut , . . . , euT ) where eut includes all related information about the
t-th edit. Please note different users may have different numbers of edits. For
each edit sequence eu, we transform it into M aspect sequences. Its m-th aspect
sequence, denoted as x(m) = (x
(m)
1 ,x
(m)
2 , . . . ,x
(m)
T ), captures the m-th aspect
of edit information and is used as the input of the m-th LSTM in our multi-
source LSTM. Figure 2 illustrates our M-LSTM model with M aspect sequences
as input. The last hidden states h
(m)
T (m = 1, · · · ,M) encode all the aspect
information of the user’s edit sequence. We apply the attention model as shown
in Equation 4–6 to combine all aspect information into the user embedding.
z
(m)
T = tanh(Wah
(m)
T ), (4)
α
(m)
T =
exp(uTa z
(m)
T )∑M
m′=1 exp(u
T
a z
(m′)
T )
, (5)
sT =
M∑
m=1
α
(m)
T · h(m)T , (6)
where Wa ∈ Rh∗h is a trained projection matrix; ua ∈ Rh is a trained parameter
vector. All the parameters, Wa and ua, in the attention model are denoted as
Θ3.
In the attention model, we first compute a hidden representation z
(m)
T of
the last hidden state h
(m)
T based on a one-layer neural network by Equation 4.
After obtaining all the M hidden representations, z
(1)
T , . . . , z
(M)
T , we apply the
softmax function to calculate the weight of each hidden state α
(m)
T by Equation
5. Finally, we compute the user embedding sT as the weighted sum of the M
hidden states by Equation 6. The advantage of the attention model is that it
can dynamically learn a weight of each aspect according to its relatedness with
the user class (e.g., vandal or benign).
We use the user embedding sT to predict P (yˆ|sT ), i.e., the probability of
user u belonging to each class k based on softmax function shown in Equation
2. We adopt the standard cross-entropy loss function (Equation 3) to train our
M-LSTM model.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of M-LSTM training. Given a training
dataset D that contains edit sequences and class labels of N users, we first
construct the M aspects of edit sequences for each user. After initializing the
parameters, Θ1, Θ2, and Θ3, in M-LSTM, in each running, we compute the M
last hidden states by LSTM networks (Line 8). Then, we adopt the attention
model to combine the M hidden states to the user embedding (Line 9). Finally,
we update the parameters of M-LSTM by using the user embedding to predict
the user label (Line 10). The parameters of M-LSTM are optimized by Adadelta
[29] with the back-propagation.
Algorithm 1: Multi-source LSTM Training
Inputs : D = {(eu, yu);u = 1, · · · , N}
Maximum training epoch Epoch
Outputs: Well-trained parameters Θ1, Θ2, Θ3
1 foreach user u in D do
2 construct M aspect sequences x(m) (m = 1, . . . ,M) from the edit sequence
eu;
3 end
4 initialize parameters Θ1, Θ2, Θ3 in M-LSTM;
5 j ← 0;
6 while j < Epoch do
7 foreach user u in D do
8 compute h
(m)
T (m = 1, . . . ,M) on M sequences of aspect vectors;
9 compute the user embedding sT by attention model (Eq. 4, 5, 6) on M
last hidden states;
10 optimize the parameter Θ1, Θ2, Θ3 in M-LSTM based on the loss
function shown in Eq. 3 with Adadelta.
11 end
12 j ← j + 1;
13 end
M-LSTM for Vandal Early Detection Our trained M-LSTM model can
then be used to predict whether a new user v is vandal or benign given his edit
sequence ev = (ev1 , · · · , evt , · · · ). The upper-left region of Figure 2 shows our
M-LSTM based vandal early detection. At each step t, we first derive its M
aspect sequences from the user’s edit sequence till step t. The hidden states are
updated with the new input evt . Thus, they are able to capture all user’s edit
aspects until t-th step. We then adopt the attention model shown in Equations
4, 5, and 6 (replacing all subscript T with t) to calculate the user embedding st.
The user embedding st captures all the user’s edit information till step t. Then,
we can use the classifier to predict the probability P (yˆ|st) of the user to be a
vandal based on st. We set a threshold τ to evaluate whether the user is vandal.
When P (yˆ|st) > τ , the user is labeled as vandal.
4 Experiments
We conduct our evaluation on UMDWikipedia dataset [11]. This dataset contains
information of around 770K edits from Jan 2013 to July 2014 (19 months) of
17105 vandals and 17105 benign users. We focus on identifying the user behaviors
on the Wikipedia articles. We remove those edits on meta pages (i.e., with titles
containing “User:”, “Talk:”, “User talk:”, “Wikipedia:”) because they do not
cause damages.
For each edit, we extract three aspects, article title, article categories, and
revert status. We choose these three aspects because both the title and categories
capture the topic information of the edited article and revert status (reported
by bots) indicates whether the edit is good or bad. It is imperative to use them
to derive user embeddings and then predict whether users are vandal or benign.
We represent article titles and categories to their title embeddings and cat-
egory embeddings based on word embeddings. Specifically, we first map each
word in the titles and categories to its word embedding and then adopt average
operation over the word embeddings to get the title embeddings and category
embeddings, respectively. The title embeddings and category embeddings reflect
the hidden features about the pages. We use the off-the-shelf pre-trained word
embeddings 6 provided by [21]. These word embeddings are widely used and
have been shown to achieve good performance on many NLP tasks. We ran-
domly initialize the words which don’t have pre-trained word embeddings. The
dimension of the word embeddings is 50. The dimension of the hidden layer of
the M-LSTM network is 32. The training epoch is 25.
4.1 Vandal Detection
To evaluate the performance of vandal detection, we split the training and testing
dataset chronologically. We use the first 9 months of users as the training dataset
and the last 10 months of users as the testing dataset. The training dataset has
8620 users and the testing dataset has 10418 users.
Table 1: Experimental results on precision, recall, F1, and accuracy of vandal
detection with different thresholds
τ Precision Recall F1 Accuracy
0.5 88.35% 96.67% 92.32% 91.33%
0.6 88.69% 96.01% 92.20% 91.24%
0.7 89.31% 94.85% 92.00% 91.10%
0.8 90.36% 92.27% 91.31% 90.52%
0.9 93.13% 74.10% 82.53% 83.09%
Table 1 shows the precision, recall, F1 and accuracy for vandal detection with
different thresholds. Precision indicates the ratio of vandals who are correctly
detected. Recall indicates the ratios of vandals who are correctly detected from
the test dataset. The default threshold for binary classification used in vandal
detection is 0.5, where our model achieves the best performance. We can also
observe that the model achieves good performances of vandal detection with
different thresholds τ from 0.5 to 0.8. Meanwhile, with increasing τ , the precision
6 http://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
increases accordingly while the recall decreases, which indicates with a higher
threshold, the model can detect vandal more accurate but can mis-classify the
vandals as benign users.
We further compare our results with the VEWS approach [11]. The VEWS
approach uses a set of hand-crafted features to detect vandals. When incor-
porating the revision status information, the VEWS can achieve around 90%
classification accuracy. Our M-LSTM achieves better accuracy on vandal detec-
tion. More importantly, our M-LSTM does not need to design dozens of features
to predict vandals. Hence our model can be easily extended to identify vandals
from other crowdsourcing knowledge bases like Wikidata.
4.2 User Embeddings
As each user has different edits and each edit has many different aspects, it is
challenging to derive users’ edit patterns. Our M-LSTM derives user embed-
dings based on user edits. As user embeddings capture user edit behaviors, they
can then be used to differentiate between benign users and vandals and detect
collaborative vandals.
Visualization We randomly select user embeddings of 3000 users and map them
to a two-dimensional space based on t-SNE approach [13]. Figure 3 shows the
visualization plot of user embeddings from M-LSTM. We observe that the benign
users and vandals are clearly separated in the projected space. This indicates the
user embeddings successfully capture the information whether an user is benign
or vandal. Hence, they can be used for vandal detection.
Fig. 3: Visualization of 3000 users in the dataset. Color of a node indicates the
type of the user. Red: “Vandals”, blue:“Benign Users”.
Clustering of User Embedding In this experiment, we adopt the classic
DBSCAN algorithm [15] to cluster user embeddings. We set the maximum radius
of the neighborhood  = 0.05 and the minimum number of points minPts = 3.
DBSCAN produces 211 clusters. Among them, 139 clusters contain only vandals
and the total number of vandals is 502 whereas 46 clusters contain only benign
users and the total number of benign users is 495. It indicates the benign users
often form large-size clusters. On the contrary, the vandals usually act as small
gangs to damage articles. For the rest 26 clusters that contain mixed vandals and
benign users, there are 17 clusters in which the vandals constitute the majority
and 9 clusters in which the benign users constitute the majority. Similarly, the
17 (vandal-majority) clusters are small with only 52 vandals whereas there are
3663 benign users in the 9 (benign-majority) clusters. Embeddings of benign
users are closer to each other than that of vandals, which can also be observed
in Figure 3. We conclude that “Benign users are much more alike; every vandal
vandalizes in its own way.”
Table 2: Three example of collaborative vandal groups. The vandals of each group
damage the same page(s). Group 1 damages the page “List of The X Factor
finalists (U.S. season 2)” in 2013-01-05 within a short time window. Group 2
damages the page “Niels Bohr” on different days. Group 3 damages the two
pages, “Shakugan no Shana” and “The Familiar of Zero”, consecutively in 2014-
04-18 within a short time window.
Group ID User ID Page ID Revision Time
Group 1
2013-01-05
4203021
37310371
02:36:32
4203016 02:42:02
4203009 02:42:55
4203006 02:44:58
4202998 02:45:32
4203002 02:47:12
4202988 02:52:12
4202986 02:56:21
Group 2
4584127
21210
2013-10-04
4597541 2013-10-23
4939865 2014-01-08
Group 3
2014-04-18
5063994
2548832 21:33:51
5982921 21:34:07
5063996
2548832 21:35:53
5982921 21:35:53
5063998
2548832 21:45:06
5982921 21:45:28
5064002
2548832 21:47:21
5982921 21:47:29
5064006
2548832 21:48:56
5982921 21:49:01
When setting the maximum radius of the neighborhood  = 0 and the mini-
mum number of points minPts = 2, DBSCAN produces 701 groups containing
1687 user embeddings. Note that under this setting all embeddings within a same
group are exactly the same. Among them, 575 groups only contain vandals and
the total number of vandals is 1396 whereas 68 groups only contain benign users
and the total number of benign users is 144. The largest vandal group contains
13 vandals and the largest benign group contains 17 benign users.
Table 2 shows three examples of collaborative vandal groups. In Row 1, the
group has 8 vandals who attacked the same page consecutively within a short
time window. In Row 2, the group has three vandals who attacked one same
page on different days. Because all these vandals were blocked after revising
the page, these vandals have high chance to be controlled by a malicious user
or group and aim to vandalize the specific page. In Row 3, we show a vandal
group containing five vandals. All the five vandals edited the same two pages,
“Shakugan no Shana” and “The Familiar of Zero”, which are both Japanese
light novels, consecutively within a short time window. These three examples
demonstrate one advantage of our M-LSTM, i.e., detecting collaborative vandals
with different behavior patterns.
Table 3: Three pairs of vandals and their edited page titles. Each pair has similar
embeddings based on the cosine similarity.
Vandal IDs Page Title Page Title
4266603
&
4498466
Live While We’re Young,
What Makes You Beautiful,
Up All Night (One Direction album),
Take Me Home (One Direction album)
Live While We’re Young,
Best Song Ever (song),
What Makes You Beautiful,
Up All Night (One Direction album),
Take Me Home (One Direction album)
4422121
&
4345947
Super Mario 3D World, Super Mario
Galaxy, Sonic Lost World, Pringles,
Action Girlz Racing,
Data Design Interactive
Super Mario World, Super Mario World 2:
Yoshi’s Island, Super Mario Bros. 3,
Virtual Boy, Nintendo DS,
Kirby Super Star, Yogurt
5032888
&
4592537
Matthew McConaughey, Maggie Q, Theo James,
Theo James, Dexter (TV series), Laker Girls,
Bayi Rockets, Arctic Monkeys,
Dulwich College Beijing
Nicolas Cage, Alan Carr,
Liam Neeson, Dale Winton,
Craig Price (murderer), Manuel Neuer
In Table 3, we further show article titles edited by three pairs of vandals.
Each pair of vandals are close to each other in the embedding space. The first
row shows that two vandals damage almost the same pages, which indicates
vandals who edit the same pages are close to each other. The second row shows
pages edited by the two vandals have common words in titles although the
title names are different. This indicates our M-LSTM can discover the semantic
collaborative behaviors on pages based on the user embeddings. The last row
shows that our M-LSTM can further identify vandals who damage the pages
with similar subject areas although there are no any common words in the titles.
This example shows the usefulness of incorporating page category information
in our M-LSTM. All above examples demonstrate that users who are close in
the low-dimensional user embedding space have similar edit patterns. Therefore,
analyzing user embeddings can help capture and understand collaborative vandal
behaviors.
4.3 Vandal Early Detection
Our vandal early detection is achieved after each edit is submitted. Although our
M-LSTM exploits revert status of the edit, we emphasize that the revert status is
inspected by the ClueBot NG in a real time manner. Hence, our M-LSTM can be
deployed for real time vandal detection. We evaluate the vandal early detection
on the 6427 users who have at least two edits in the testing dataset. Table 4
shows the precision, recall and F1 of our M-LSTM on vandal early detection.
We vary the threshold τ from 0.5 to 0.9. Similar to the results of vandal detection
shown in Table 1, with increasing τ , a classifier with a higher threshold has more
confidence about the prediction, resulting in a higher precision. On the contrary,
the recall decreases with the increasing of τ because fewer users will be marked as
vandals. The F1 score reaches the maximum with τ = 0.9. However, comparing
with the results of vandal detection, the vandal early detection has a lower
precision but much higher recall. This indicates that we lose some precision
but achieve big recall when using partial edit information to do early vandal
detection.
Table 4 further shows the average number of edits before the vandals were
blocked by the administrators and the ratio of vandals who can be early detected
over the whole testing dataset. We can observe that the average number of edits
keeps relatively steady while the threshold increases. Meanwhile, the ratio of
early detected vandals has a significant decreasing while the threshold τ = 0.9.
Note that the ratios of early detected vandals with thresholds from 0.5 to 0.8
are only a little lower than the recall values, which indicates that most of the
vandals who are correctly detected are early detected. Overall, setting threshold
τ = 0.8 will achieve a balance performance between vandal early detection and
accurate prediction.
Table 4: Experimental results on precision, recall and F1 of vandal early detec-
tion, the average number of edits before the vandals are blocked, and the ratio
of vandals who are early detected.
τ Precision Recall F1 # of Edits % of Early Detected
0.5 84.10% 99.07% 90.97% 3.61 97.35%
0.6 84.96% 98.99% 91.44% 3.60 96.87%
0.7 85.81% 98.82% 91.86% 3.50 95.94%
0.8 86.88% 98.76% 92.44% 3.59 93.34%
0.9 89.89% 98.34% 93.93% 3.53 72.32%
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have developed a multi-source LSTM model to encode the
user behaviors to user embeddings for Wikipedia vandal detection. The M-
LSTM is able to simultaneously learn different aspects of user edit information,
thus user embeddings accurately capture the different aspects of user behaviors.
Our M-LSTM achieves the state-of-the-art results on vandal detection. Further-
more, we showed that user embeddings are able to identify collaborative vandal
groups with various patterns. Different from existing works which require a list
of hand-designed features, our M-LSTM can automatically learn user embed-
dings from user edits. The user embeddings can be used for a variety of data
mining tasks such as classification, clustering, outlier analysis, and visualization.
Our empirical evaluation has demonstrated its potential for analyzing collabo-
rative vandals and early vandal detection. In the future, we plan to incorporate
into our M-LSTM more information about user edits, e.g., user-user relations
and hyperlink relations among articles. These relations are modeled as graphs
and can be naturally incorporated into M-LSTM by using network embedding
approaches [22, 25]. We also plan to conduct comprehensive evaluations on col-
laborative vandal detection.
Repeatability. Our software together with the datasets used in this paper are
available at https://bitbucket.org/bookcold/vandal_detection.
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